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Comparative Study of U.S. and
West German Political Finance
Regulation: The Question of
Contribution Controls
By THOMAS F. GEDE
Member of the Class of 1981.
1. INTRODUCTION
While much West German political law took shape in the late
1960's," it was in the decade of the 1970's that an extensive body of
federal campaign finance law developed in the United States,
2
brought about by the soaring costs of election campaigns$ and the
accompanying concern about the dominant influence of money on
the election process. Despite an almost universal concern in West-
ern representative democracies about the role of money in politics,
each nation has focused on different means with which to regulate
the political financing process. Although regulation may be
designed to equalize competition 4 or to block the inordinate influ-
ence of wealthy classes within society, it may also impede the ef-
forts of nations to encourage election competition and build politi-
cal party strength. In particular, parliamentary governments have
unique considerations which Americans may not share.5 Variations
1. E.g., inter alia, Parteiengesetz (Political Parties Act), Law of July 24, 1967 [1967]
BUNDESGESEMZBLATr [BGB1] I S.773 (W. Ger.) [hereinafter referred to in text as Political
Parties Act, and cited as Parteiengesetz]; Judgment of Dec. 3, 1968 BUNDESVERFASSUNGS-
GERIcHT [BVerfGE] 24, 300 (W. Ger. 1968).
2. See, e.g., The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225 (as
amended by the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendment of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443,
and the Fpderal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-238) codified
at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 and 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-42 (1976) [hereinafter cited as FECA]; Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
3. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., ELECTING CONGRESS 95 (1978).
4. E.g., by placing ceilings on contributions, so that no one party may rely on unequal
assets, or by public financing, where each party is given a financial "floor" to start.
5. See H. Alexander, Political Finance Regulation in International Perspective, 12-21
(Sept. 1979) (prepared for Parties, PACs and Campaign Finance Laws Conference spon-
sored by American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C.).
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in the approach to political finance regulation, particularly in the
area of controls on party or campaign donations, illustrate the dif-
ferent political and legal concerns of those nations.
American legislators were concerned primarily with the undue
influence of wealthy interests on the political process when the
first laws regulating political contributions were passed in 1907 and
1925.6 Those concerns, continued to the present day and height-
ened by the Watergate scandal, dominate the many influencing
factors behind the body of American law on political contribution
controls. These controls have taken the form of contribution limi-
tations and extensive disclosure requirements.
A predominant concern in the Federal Republic of Germany,
however, has been the low level of participation in the political
process, and the concommitant fear that controls could be
"manipulated in an antidemocratic fashion."'7 Thus, German legis-
lators have considered incentives for donations and a program of
public subsidies in order to provide increased financial support to
political parties.
West Germany has relied on public financing of the political
process as a means of furthering effective competition. As in other
countries with a parliamentary system of government, subsidies
are provided to the political parties. Parties nominate the candi-
dates, control the campaign, and spend the funds from party trea-
suries.8 Although public financing can provide a better opportunity
for competition by establishing a "floor," it does not provide a con-
trol on donations. By July 1967, in section 25 of the Political Par-
ties Act, the Bundestag approved a requirement for the disclosure
of donations greater than DM 20,000.9 With public financing, tax
incentives, and no controls or prohibitions beyond the disclosure
requirement, it is the thrust of German law to promote contribu-
tions to the political parties, encourage broad participation in the
6. See Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907); Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925,
ch. 368, 43 Stat. 1059, 1070 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18 U.S.C. and subsequently
repealed and superseded by the FECA, supra note 2).
7. A. HEIDENHEIMER & F. LANGDON, BusiNEss ASSOCIATIONS AND THE FINANCING OF PO-
LITICAL PARTIES 74 (1968) [hereinafter cited as HEIDENHEIMER & LANGDON].
8. See discussion of German parliamentary campaign practices, in text accompanying
notes 114-56, infra.
9. Parteiengesetz, supra note 1, § 25. The original § 25 provision for a DM 200,000
limit for corporations was nullified by a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in
1968. Section 25 was amended to reflect a limit of DM 20,000 on July 22, 1969. See notes
and text accompanying notes 149-50, infra.
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political process, and bolster the strength of the political parties.
The centerpiece of American law governing political financing
is the Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), with the
major amendments of 1974 and 1976.10 The FECA includes provi-
sions governing several areas of campaign activity: public financ-
ing; private campaign contribution limits and source disclosure re-
quirements; campaign expenditure limitations and disclosure
requirements; and the establishment of a Federal Election Com-
mission (FEC) with the authority to issue regulations and enforce
the law. The impact of these laws and regulations has yet to be
fully determined, but it has been frequently noted that FECA dis-
closure requirements are burdensome, that contribution limitations
with no accompanying personal wealth expenditure limitations
skew the equities of candidate campaign opportunity, and that po-
litical action committees are beginning to overshadow the tradi-
tional roles of the American political parties.11
It is not possible to consider the question of private campaign
contribution limitations independently of the other "tools" regu-
lating campaign finance in the United States. Ceilings on contribu-
tions are given concrete political meaning only when seen as a part
of a scheme that also includes limits on campaign expenditures.
Disclosure requirements, gift tax deduction limitations, corrupt
practices prohibitions, compliance procedures, a penalties struc-
ture, and public money matching grants are all part of a campaign
finance legal landscape which should serve several basic goals.
Professor Herbert E. Alexander 12 outlines five specific areas of
concern:
a. to preserve the opportunity for all citizens to participate
equally or nearly equally in financing politics;
b. to provide enough money for competitive campaigns;
c. to provide a fair share of financial resources without rewarding
frivolous candidates;
d. to free candidates from undue pressures from their contribu-
tors; and,
10. FECA, supra note 2.
11. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., supra note 3, at 108, 120.
12. Professor Alexander is Director of Citizens' Research Foundation, B.A., University
of North Carolina, M.A., University of Connecticut, Ph.D. in political science at Yale Uni-
versity. He has served on faculty at Princeton, University of Pennsylvania, as consultant to
the President of the United States, Comptroller General of the United States, and Office of
Federal Elections at General Accounting Office. He has written extensively on matters relat-
ing to money in politics.
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e. to prevent corruption.13
Although all five goals have been associated with rationales for
public financing schemes, it is the last two which go directly to the
question of contribution controls. Contribution limitations,
prohibitions, and source disclosure requirements are designed to
prevent candidates from obligating themselves to certain interests
and to provide the public with information about the financial
sources of candidates. Disclosure, according to Professor Alexan-
der, can also serve to increase public confidence in the political
process and help curb excesses and abuses in political
contributions."
It is difficult to gauge whether the FECA contribution controls
and the FEC regulations accomplish these goals. However, the in-
creased bureaucratic effort of regulating and enforcing political
financing, combined with the skewing effect of a major court deci-
sion striking expenditure limits15 and other effects of the FECA in
the political market place, may call into question the efficacy of the
current controls. If public financing in the United States was in-
creased and extended to congressional and senatorial elections,
perhaps the need for stringent controls would diminish."6 As a
model, the West German political financing system stresses equal-
ity of opportunity in politics and increased participation in the
financing of political parties, without instituting contribution lim-
its and heavy disclosure requirements.
II. U.S. FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW
The first major effort to control contributions in federal cam-
paigns started during the administration of President Theodore
Roosevelt, brought about by revelations of heavy spending by big
business. Concern about the unchecked power of large corporations
in the early 20th century led the National Publicity Law Associa-
tion to call for federal legislation prohibiting corporate contribu-
13. H. Alexander, supra note 5, at 2, n.2, citing D. ADAMANY & G. AGREE, POLITCAL
MONEY: A STRATEGY FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN AMERICA 8-12 (1975), with format sug-
gested by TORONTO COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND EXPENSES, A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF
ELECTION FINANCE LEGISLATION 1978, 1-2 (1979).
14. H. Alexander, supra note 5, at 5.
15. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) discussed at text accompanying notes 49-74
infra.




tions to candidates for federal office.17 Roosevelt echoed the propo-
sal in 1905, calling for congressional action.18
A. Early Attempts at Regulation
Congress passed the Tillman Act on January 26, 1907, prohib-
iting contributions by corporations or national banks in any federal
election.1 9 This prohibition, incorporated in later acts, has survived
to the present. Although the prohibition has been criticized as
overambitious, unenforceable, and discriminatory,20 it has been
part of the American political finance landscape through most of
the 20th century, reflecting a continuing American suspicion of big
business and its influence in politics.
The Tillman Act, with subsequent amendments passed in
1910, established the first major disclosure provision as well. For
contributions of $100 or more, multistate political committees"1
17. CONGRESSIONAL QuARTRamy INC., supra note 3, at 103.
18. In 3 STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES OF THE PRESIMT, 1790-1966, at 2161 (A.
Schlesinger ed. 1967), President Roosevelt, in his annual message to Congress of Dec. 5,
1905, stated: "All contributions by corporations to any political committee or for any politi-
cal purpose should be forbidden by law;, directors should not be permitted to use stockhold-
ers' money for such purposes; and, moreover, a prohibition of this kind would be, as far as it
went, an effective method of stopping the evils aimed at in corrupt practices acts."
19. Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907). The Act states:
[T]hat it shall be unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by
authority of any laws of Congress, to make a money contribution in connection
with any election to any political office .... Every corporation which shall make
any contribution in violation of the foregoing provisions shall be subject to a fine
not exceeding five thousand dollars, and every officer or director of any corpora-
tion who shall consent to any contribution ... in violation of the foregoing provi-
sions shall upon conviction be punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand
and not less than two hundred and fifty dollars, or by imprisonment for a term
not more than one year, or both ....
20. See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), where the Su-
preme Court upheld the right of a corporation to make political expenditures from general
corporate funds in connection with a state referendum. Aside from the specific statutory
question, the status of corporations in the political-giving world was tangentially discussed.
Plaintiffs argued that statutes prohibiting corporations from making certain political contri-
butions (here, a state referendum) violated the first amendment and the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.
The Court stated that the inherent worth of free speech in terms of informing the public
does not depend -on its source, i.e., whether from a corporation, association, union or indi-
vidual. Justice White's dissent, however, stressed that corporations are artificial entities
given special economic advantages. Justice White further articulated his fear that this case
may in time lead to invalidation of all laws prohibiting corporate political activity. On its
face, this is a narrow holding, and there are no decisions pending on the broader question.
For a European view, see, e.g., HEMENfEIMER & LANGDON, supra note 7, at 75.
21. Described as "organizations which shall in two or more States influence the result
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were required to file the name and address of the contributor with
the Clerk of the House of Representatives. Disclosure require-
ments for expenditures were also enacted, which required the filing
of the name and address of any recipient of $10 or more from such
a political committee. Finally, expenditure limitations were passed
by Congress in 1911,22 thus beginning the second decade of the
20th century with a new, full battery of campaign law.
In the next two decades, however, important additions were
made to federal election controls. In February 1925, Congress en-
acted new legislation which incorporated the provisions of the Till-
man Act and expanded the expenditure limitations. The new law,
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act,23 also incorporated an earlier
ban on solicitations of federal employees by other federal employ-
ees or by candidates.24 In the area of contribution controls, the Act
required the filing of campaign finance reports and expanded the
meaning of contributions to include "gift, subscription, loan, ad-
vance, or deposit, of money, or anything of value.... The Act
has served as the primary campaign finance regulation in American
law until the passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971, discussed infra in Part II, section D. The first court chal-
lenge of the disclosure requirements of the 1925 Act occurred in
1934 in the case of Burroughs and Cannon v. United States.2a In
upholding the public filing of campaign finances, the Supreme
Court stated: "Congress reached the conclusion that public disclo-
sure of political contributions, together with the names of contrib-
utors and other details, would tend to prevent the corrupt use of
money to affect elections.
'2 7
... of an election at which Representatives in Congress are to be elected." Pub. L. No. 61-
274, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822, 823 (1910).
22. Candidates for United States Senate were limited to $10,000 and for the House of
Representatives to $5,000. Pub. L. No. 62-32, ch. 33, 37 Stat. 25, 28 (1911).
23. Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925) (originally codi-
fied in scattered sections of 2, 18 U.S.C. and superseded by the FECA, supra note 2).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 211 (1925), ch. 5, 44 Stat. pt. 1, at 476 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§
606, 607). Section 210 (now 606) provided for immunity from prosecution for civil servants
where such persons refuse to make or withhold from making political contributions. Section
211 (now 607) was the no-solicitation clause of one federal employee by another or by a
candidate.
25. 2 U.S.C. § 241(d) (1925), ch. 8, 44 Stat. pt. 1, at 15; also in Federal Corrupt Prac-
tices Act, ch. 368, § 302(d), 43 Stat. 1071 (1925).
26. 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
27. Id. at 548.
[Vol. 4
Political Finance Regulation
B. The Hatch Act
An additional contribution limitation appeared in the Hatch
Act of 1939,2s legislation generally dealing with federal employees.
The Hatch Act prohibits active participation of federal employees
in campaign activity and bars political contributions from persons
receiving federal relief funds.29 In the 1940 amendment to the
Hatch Act, Congress also prohibited contributions from anyone
working for the federal government under contract.30 However, the
major contribution control established under the 1940 amendment
was a limit of $5,000 per contributor in any calendar year to aid in
the nomination or election of a candidate for federal office. 1 This
was the first established dollar limitation placed on contributions
in United States political finance law, and, significantly, it applied
to primary as well as general elections.
The application of federal restrictions on primary election
campaigns was upheld by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Classic et al., and in Smith v. Allwright 3 2 The decisions clearly led
to the passage of the body of restrictions enumerated in the Taft-
Hartley Act of 1947.33 In the Taft-Hartley Act, labor unions were
prohibited from making contributions to campaigns from their
general fund.34 By the time of passage of the Taft-Hartley Act,
contribution controls included a broad array of restrictions: prohi-
bition of contributions from corporations, national banks, labor
unions, those holding public contracts, and those receiving federal
relief funds; a $5,000 contribution limitation per candidate im-
posed on individuals or groups in any calendar year; and restric-
28. The Hatch Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-252, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939).
29. I.e., those funds described in Pub. Res. 76-1, ch. 1, § 5(a), 53 Stat. 509 (1939), where
it is unlawful to "solicit. . .any assessment, subscription, or contribution for the campaign
expense of any individual or political party from any person entitled to or recovering com-
pensation or employment provided for by the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1938
30. Pub. L. No. 76-753, ch. 640 § 5(a), 54 Stat. 767 (1940).
31. Id. § 13, at 770. Violation calls for a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment
for not more than five years. Id. § 13(d), at 771.
32. United States v. Classic, et al., 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944). The Smith decision confirmed the Classic decision in the latter's overturning of the
Supreme Court decision Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921), which struck down
provisions of the 1911 act on campaign expenditure limitations in primary elections. Such
an approach was consistent with the FCPA of 1925, supra note 23.
33. The Taft-Hartley Act, Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101,
ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), (amending National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449).
34. Id. § 304 at 159 (amending § 313 of FCPA of 1925, supra note 23).
No. 3]
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tions on the ability of federal employees and candidates to solicit
contributions from 'other federal employees. Finally, the require-
ment of public filing of all campaign finances, including source dis-
closure, completed the scattered but extensive body of finance reg-
ulation. It should be noted that these restrictions applied only to
campaigns for federal office,35 in both primary and general
elections.
C. Avoidance Mechanisms
This body of law, however, was widely evaded, ignored and, in
many cases, unenforced for years. Even where the formalities were
observed, corporations frequently avoided the spirit of the cam-
paign restrictions. According to a 1956 Senate Subcommittee on
Privileges and Elections, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce actually
urged corporations to spend money for political purposes with a
detailed list of "approved" campaign activities.36 Corporations
would make use of advertising and entertainment funds of trade
associations, provide corporate facilities for candidates and pay bo-
nuses for contributions made to preferred political causes. In order
to bypass the Taft-Hartley restrictions on contributions from labor
unions' general funds, labor unions developed sophisticated politi-
cal action committees and committees for political education,
many of which had parallel membership and management with the
union. Such committees, embodying the interests of the unions,
would solicit funds and participate in campaign finance activity.
37
Additional avoidance mechanisms were also available. A donor
could give a large amount to a candidate and avoid disclosure by
funneling it through several supportive committees, with each
committee getting just less than $100. Alternatively, a wealthy do-
nor could individually contribute the $5,000 legal maximum, but
35. Congress did extend these limitations to state and local campaigns for corporations
holding national charters and for national banks and utilities subject to the Public Utility
Holding Company Act. See FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE POLrr-
ICAL ACTIVITIES, LOBBYING AND CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS, S. REP. No. 395, 85th Cong., Ist
Sess.
36. C. JOHNSON, AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 363 (5th ed. 1960).
37. Id. at 365. The Supreme Court upheld the ability of unions to use certain of their
own funds for political activity in United States v. International Union, etc., 352 U.S. 568
(1957). However that court distinguished between contributions and expenditures, indicat-
ing that attempts to influence the electorate as to particular candidates would be improper.
The associated political action committees, of course, are free to solicit funds for candidates,
contribute funds and conduct associated political campaign activity.
[Vol. 4
Political Finance Regulation
then increase that donation by having his or her spouse and family
members each "contribute" $5,000 as well. Since the 1925 Act only
applied to contributions made with the "knowledge and consent"
of the candidate, a candidate could disclaim all contributions, in-
sist that only independent committees handle funds, and still en-
joy the benefits of the contributions."
D. FECA of 1971
The first comprehensive legislation affecting political finance
after the Hatch Act was the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971."9 This Act imposed a spending limit on media advertising
and required full disclosure of campaign finances. In addition, sev-
eral key contribution controls were enacted in an effort to over-
come some of the avoidance mechanisms which had plagued the
earlier controls. A ceiling was placed on contributions from a can-
didate or his immediate family to his own campaign. Candidates
for President or Vice-President were limited to $50,000, candidates
for Senator were limited to $35,000, and candidates for Represen-
tative were limited to $25,000.40 The FECA of 1971 also restated
the $100 disclosure requirement on contributions, and extended it
to loans as well.41 Reports of all campaign receipts and expendi-
tures had to be filed quarterly. Committees with receipts in excess
of $1,000 had to fie a statement of organization with the names of
the officers, the scope of the committee and the candidates which
the committee was supporting. 2 Contributions to a candidate by
one person in the name of another were also prohibited.43
The Tax Checkoff Campaign Fund in the Revenue Act of 1971
was another contribution limit enacted that year. This plan pro-
vided for public financing of a major party presidential candidate
and prohibited a candidate who accepted public funding from ac-
cepting private contributions.44 It applied to general elections and
38. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., supra note 3, at 105.
39. Pub. L. No. 92-225. See FECA, supra note 2.
40. Provisions nullified by Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
41. 2 U.S.C. § 433(b)(5).
42. 2 U.S.C. § 433.
43. 2 U.S.C. § 411(f).
44. Le., insofar as public funds are available. If such funds are short of the amount to
which the candidate is entitled to spend, private contributions could be accepted. (Primary
races have a matching fund public financing scheme established in Pub. L. No. 93-443). See
Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 562 (1971).
See also Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 487 F. Supp. 280, 284
No. 3]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
was first used in the 1976 presidential race between Jimmy Carter
and Gerald R. Ford.
Loopholes and evasions continued to be utilized in spite of the
FECA of 1971. One method was the "pass-through" contribution,
where money could be passed from the original donor to another
person or committee with instructions on the eventual destination
of the donation. The original donor could remain anonymous and
distribute large amounts of money, all of which would find its way
to the candidate of his choice. Also, contributions to non-political
organizations, such as social clubs, which were not required to file
statements of organization with federal authorities, could find their
way to candidates for federal office, again masking the original do-
nor(s). Donations of less than $100 could be given frequently by
the same person, amassing into a large sum, without disclosure of
the donor. After the Watergate scandal exposed many of these
practices, there was a growing demand for better legislation and
more stringent enforcement, preferably through an independent
election commission. 4
5
E. FECA Amendment of 1974
As a result, Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendment of 1974,4 which made major adjustments to the
FECA. It created a Federal Election Commission, and established
spending and contribution limits. The amendment was comprehen-
sive, extensive, and daring with its restrictions, leading to conjec-
ture about its constitutionality. Noting the constitutional difficul-
ties as he signed the amendment into law in October 1974,
President Ford remarked that he was "sure that such issues can be
resolved in the courts.'
47
The law was immediately challenged in court by a coalition of
liberal and conservative interests, including Senator James L.
Buckley, former Senator Eugene McCarthy, the New York Civil
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) cert. denied 445 U.S. 955 (1980) holding that an additional private fund-
raising limit did not violate constitutional rights of candidates or contributors. That court
held that the language of the footnote in Buckley (424 U.S. at 57, n.65) which said that
Congress "may condition acceptance of public funds on an agreement by the candidate to
abide by specified expenditure limitations" settled the issue of the provision's
constitutionality.
45. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., supra note 3, at 108.
46. Pub. L. No. 93-443. See FECA, supra note 2.




Liberties Union, and Human Events, a conservative publication.48
The resulting case was the landmark decision Buckley v. Valeo,49
in which the Supreme Court dealt with a variety of issues that had
been the subject of the 1974 amendment, including the proper con-
struction of the Federal Election Commission and the public
financing of elections. In general, the Court let the contribution
limits stand, but overturned the amendment's provisions limiting
expenditures as an unconstitutional infringement on the freedom
of expression.
50
F. Buckley v. Valeo-The Supreme Court's Response to the
FECA
In Buckley, the predominant issue for the court was the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of the provisions of the 1974 amend-
ment with respect to contribution and expenditure limits. The
amendment established a dollar limit for contributions by an indi-
vidual to a candidate or to a candidate's authorized committee of
$1,000 per election. The total aggregate contribution limit for indi-
viduals under the amendment is $25,000 per year.5 1 By compari-
son, political committees are authorized to contribute $5,000 per
election, with no aggregate limit in any year. Political committees
not qualifying as a "multicandidate committee" 52 have the same
limit imposed per election as individuals.
1. Expenditure limits
The FECA expenditure limits were established at $10 million
for a presidential primary, $20 million for a presidential general
election, $100,000 (or eight cents per registered voter, whichever is
greater) for Senate primaries, $150,000 (or twelve cents per voter)
for Senate general elections, and $70,000 for each House election.53
Candidates were also restricted as to the amount of personal
48. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., supra note 3, at 109.
49. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
50. Id.
51. Now 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3), previously 18 U.S.C. § 608 in the 1971 Act and 1974
amendment.
52. 2 U.S.C. § 411a(a)(4) describes a "multicandidate committee" as one which has
been registered under the act for at least 6 months, has received contributions from more
than 50 persons, and has made contributions to 5 or more candidates for federal office. It
cannot be a state political party organization.
53. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., supra note 3, at 113-14.
No. 3]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
wealth they could use for their own campaign: $50,000 for Presi-
dent, $35,000 for a Senate seat and $25,000 for a seat in the House
of Representatives. 4 Independent expenditures, those made by
persons not involved with the candidate or the candidate's political
committee, were limited to $1,000 per candidate per election. 55
The Supreme Court overturned the expenditure limitations as
unconstitutionally infringing on the freedom of expression, stating:
"No governmental interest .. . is sufficient to justify [these re-
strictions] on the quantity of political expression." 56 The Court
went on to state that such limits could not properly achieve the
goals of restricting the high costs of campaigning or equalizing the
opportunity of candidates.
The Court did not approve of suppressing this "political ex-
pression" through "governmental restrictions on the quantity of
campaign spending and the resulting limitation on the scope of
federal campaigns."" In fact, the Court concluded, the ceilings
may "handicap a candidate who lacked substantial name recogni-
tion or exposure of his views before the start of the campaign." '58
The Court refuted any implied control of corruption or improper
motives as a goal of the limits on spending by stating that "[tihere
is nothing invidious, improper, or unhealthy in permitting such
funds to be spent to carry the candidate's message to the
electorate." 5
The Court also overturned the expenditure limitations on in-
dependent exenditures and on the use of private wealth by a can-
didate. The Court found that the "governmental interest in
preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption is inade-
quate to justify [the] ceiling on independent expenditures." 60 The
amendment's restrictions were said to directly interfere with "the
First Amendment right to 'speak one's mind. . . on all public in-
stitutions' includ[ing] the right to engage in 'vigorous advocacy no
less than abstract discussion.' "'I
In overturning the personal wealth limitation, the Court found
that the interest of "prevention of actual and apparent corruption
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 55 (1976).
57. Id. at 57.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 56.
60. Id. at 45.
61. Id. at 48.
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of the political process does not support the limitation on the can-
didate's expenditure of his own personal funds 2 . . . [T]he candi-
date. . . has a First Amendment right to engage in the discussion
of public issues and vigorously and tirelessly to advocate his own
election .... "
The Court's decision to overturn the expenditure controls
must be seen in the context of the Court's decision to uphold the
contribution limitations. Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion,
pointed out the uneven effect of leaving contribution limits intact
while making the use of personal wealth limitless:
The wealthy candidate's immediate access to a substantial per-
sonal fortune may give him an initial advantage that his less
wealthy opponent can never overcome .... While the limita-
tions on contributions are neutral in the sense that all candidates
are foreclosed from accepting large contributions ... with that
option removed, the less wealthy candidate is without the means
to match the large initial expenditures of money of which the
wealthy candidate is capable. In short, the limitations on contri-
butions put a premium on a candidate's personal wealth.
4
Justice Marshall's analysis deals with the foremost remaining diffi-
culty in United States political finance regulation: how to equalize
the opportunity of candidates, wealthy or poor, without sup-
pressing constitutionally protected freedom of expression.
In another dissent, Chief Justice Burger argued the lack of a
distinction between the communication inherent in contributions
and that of expenditures. 65 However, the Chief Justice failed to ad-
dress the historical origins of contribution controls and to contrast
those origins with the legislative intent behind expenditure con-
trols. Where the justifications for the two controls differ, so the
two may differ in the manner and quality of "speech" that they
serve. As discussed earlier, contribution controls were enacted due
to a long history of concern with corruption and undue influence
on politicians, whereas expenditure controls were enacted with an
underlying concern for the rising costs of campaigns and a desire
to "equalize" the opportunity for candidates.
Only Justice White pointed to the circuitous potential for
62. Id. at 53.
63. Id. at 52.
64. Id. at 288-89.
65. Id. at 243.
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"corruption" without the expenditure limits by suggesting that:
[W]ithout limits on total expenditures, campaign costs will inevi-
tably and endlessly escalate. Pressure to raise funds will con-
stantly build and with it the temptation to resort in 'emergencies'
to those sources of large sums, who, history shows, are sufficiently
confident of not being caught to risk flouting contribution
limits."6
In such reasoning, Justice White relied partially on a "history
shows" analysis and on a presumption that contribution controls
would be ineffective or unenforced, thereby justifying expenditure
limitations. Only the majority opinion distinguished the two suffi-
ciently to impose different standards.
With the exception of the problem articulated by Justice Mar-
shall, much of the adverse impact feared from the lifting of general
and independent expenditure limitations may have been lessened
by the campaign act amendments of 1976, the regulations issued
by the Federal Elections Commission (FEC) and the enforcement
techniques employed by the FEC. However, the skewing effect of
contribution limits placed on candidates who must face wealthy
opponents with unlimited access to personal funds remains a prob-
lem on the political finance landscape.
2. Contribution limits
The Supreme Court's approval of contribution limitations pre-
served the major thrust of the FECA 1974 amendment, which was
curbing the reality or appearance of improper influence stemming
from the dependence of candidates on large campaign contribu-
tions.6 7 The majority opinion stated that the governmental inter-
ests "served by restricting the size of financial contributions to po-
litical candidates are sufficient to justify the limited effect upon
First Amendment freedoms caused by the $1000 contribution
ceiling." 68
Although the majority opinion dealt to a great extent with the
constitutional issue of defining "speech," as compared to "con-
duct," in the giving of money, the Court concluded that a "contri-
bution serves as a general expression of support," with the signifi-
cance of the expression resting "soley on the undifferentiated,
66. Id. at 264.
67. Id. at 25.
68. Id. at 29.
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symbolic act of contributing.""9 Due to the symbolic nature of the
donation, a limitation on the amount of money a person may give
"thus involves little direct restraint on his political communica-
tion. ' 70 The Court rejected arguments that the contribution limita-
tions burdened first amendment freedoms, employed overbroad
dollar limits, and discriminated against candidates opposing in-
cumbent office-holders and against minor-party candidates.
The Court outlined the three primary interests of government
in applying the contribution limits. First, the limits serve to pre-
vent corruption "spawned by the real or imagined coercive influ-
ence of large financial contributions on candidates' positions and
on their actions if elected to office."17 1 The Court outlined the man-
ner in which large contributions undermine the integrity of repre-
sentative democracy, noting that both quid pro quo arrangements
and the public awareness of the "opportunities for abuse inherent
in a regime of large individual financial contributions 7 2 were of
preeminent concern in this regard. It also found that the limits on
first amendment freedoms inherent in the contribution limits were
justified by the weighty interests served by the latter.
Second, the limits serve to "mute" the voices of the wealthy
contenders, thereby equalizing "the relative ability of all citizens to
affect the outcome of elections. '7 Finally, the ceilings provide
some measure of containment. In dealing with these last argu-
ments, the Court recognized that incumbents can attract large con-
tributions with more ease than challengers, and that the contribu-
tion limits thereby benefit the class of challengers as a whole.74
G. FECA Amendments of 1976
At President Ford's urging in early 1976,75 Congress consid-
ered legislation to reinstitute the Federal Election Commission,
which had been held unconstitutional by the Buckley decision due
69. Id. at 21.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 25.
72. Id. at 27.
73. Id. at 26.
74. Id. at 32. Footnote 37 noted that almost $4 million was raised in 1974 for congres-
sional candidates by contributions of more than $1,000. Of that amount, almost twice as
much went to incumbents as to challengers.
75. Statement on Signing the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976,
1976 PUB. PAPERS 1529 (1979).
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to the method of appointments to the Commission.76 As a result,
Congress presented the President with an extensive set of amend-
ments to the basic law, which not only reinstituted the Federal
Election Commission, but provided a number of criminal penalties
for violations of the campaign limits and regulations.
The amendments, signed into law on May 11, 1976, include
penalties for violations of any provision of the act in the making,
receiving or reporting of any contribution or expenditure having a
value of $1,000 or more. These penalties7 s include a fine calculated
as the greater of either $25,000 or 300 percent of the amount of the
contribution or expenditure involved in the violation, or imprison-
ment for not more than one year, or both.
Additionally, the enforcement section of the law provides for
civil penalties of up to $5,000, or the amount of the contribution or
expenditure involved, whichever is greater, when the FEC insti-
tutes a civil action in a United States district court. Such actions
can be instituted for relief, including a temporary or permanent
injunction, restraining order, or other appropriate order."9
Other major provisions include the requirement that individu-
als or committees who make independent expenditures of over
$100 for a candidate swear that the expenditures were not made in
collusion with that candidate.80  Reporting provisions were
strengthened as well: independent expenditures of $1,000 or more
made less than fifteen days before or within fifteen days of any
election must be reported to the Commission within twenty-four
hours."1
1. Contribution Limits and Prohibitions
Contribution limitations under the 1976 amendment can best
76. Appointments, according to the 1974 provisions, included those made by the
Speaker of the House and the President pro tern of the Senate. Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendment of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 310(a)(1), 88 Stat. 1263. These were ruled
unconstitutional in Buckley v. Valeo as violative of the President's power of appointment.
421 U.S. at 140-43. The 1976 amendments reinstituted the FEC with all six voting members
appointed by the President with confirmation of the Senate. Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 101(a)(1), 90 Stat. 475 (1976).
77. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat.
475 (1976).
78. Id. § 329. See generally 2 U.S.C. § 441j (1976).
79. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(5)(C) (1976).




be- summarized in the following form:
a. from an individual
- to a candidate: $1,000/election 2
- to a national political party: $20,000/year
- to a political committee: $5,000/year
- total per year: $25,000
b. from multicandidate committee
3
- to a candidate: $5,000/election
- to a national political party: $15,000/year
- to a political committee: $5,000/year
- no total limit per year
c. from other committee
- to a candidate: $1,000/election
- to a national political party: $20,000/year
- to a political committee: $5,000/year
- no total limit per year"
National party committees, such as the Republican National Com-
mittee, or one established by it, such as the Wisconsin Republican
State Central Committee, may contribute $17,500 to U.S. Senate
candidates per calendar year. 5 Otherwise, in most cases, they qual-
ify as multicandidate committees.
Contribution prohibitions are also compiled in the U.S. Code,
with the following categories and pertinent sections specified:
a. contributions by corporations, national banks and labor unions
prohibited (2 U.S.C. § 441b)ss
b. contributions by government contractors prohibited (2 U.S.C.
§ 441c)
c. contributions from foreign nationals prohibited (2 U.S.C.
§ 441e)
d. contributions made in the name of another prohibited (2
U.S.C. § 441f)
82. 2 U.S.C. § 431(a) (1976) defines an "election" as:
(1) a general, special, primary, or runoff election; (2) a convention or caucus of a
political party which has authority to nominate a candidate; (3) a primary election
held for the selection of delegates to a national nominating convention of a politi-
cal party; and (4) a primary election held for the expression of a preference for the
nomination of persons for election to the office of President.
83. See note 51, supra.
84. All stated limits from 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (1976). Format suggested by
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., supra note 3, at 111.
85. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(h).
86. The prohibition of corporate contributions was not challenged in Buckley, but see
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), discussed in note 20, supra.
No. 3]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
e. cash contributions in excess of $100 prohibited (2 U.S.C.
§ 441g)
f. promise of appointment by candidate illegal (18 U.S.C. § 600)
g. solicitation of contributions regulated (18 U.S.C. §§ 601-606)
The 1976 reforms included a provision which prohibited corpora-
tion-associated political action committees from soliciting contri-
butions from any person other than the company stockholders and
their families, and executive or administrative personnel and their
families. Equally, labor unions or their associated groups cannot
solicit contributions from any person other than the union mem-
bers and their families.
87
2. Disclosure of Contributions
Disclosure of contributions is a key element in the contribu-
tion control scheme. Disclosure informs the public as to whether
elected officials are subject to possible undue pressures by contrib-
utors.88 In addition to precise record-keeping,8 9 candidates must
file reports indicating receipts and expenditures. The filing timeta-
ble depends upon whether the candidate is running for office in
that calendar year, or merely maintaining his/her committee and
funds.
If a candidate has contributions or expenditures greater than
$1,000 in any calendar quarter, a report must be filed.90 A contri-
bution of $1,000 or more received within fifteen days of an election
must be reported within forty-eight hours of its receipt.9 1 Reports
must disclose the full name, mailing address, occupation and prin-
cipal place of business, if any, of each person who has made contri-
butions (including the purchase of tickets to dinners, rallies, lunch-
eons, etc.) within the calendar year in an aggregate amount or
value in excess of $200, with the amount and date of such
contributions.92
Since the amount which triggers the reporting requirement is
gauged on an annual basis, the regulations specify that once the
87. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4). It is noted that there are exceptions to this rule, as provided
for by 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(B), (C).
88. R. WINTER, JR., CAMPAIGN FINANCING AND POLITIcAL FREEDOM 21 (1973).
89. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 102.9-.15 (1981).
90. 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(1)(C) (1976).
91. 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(1) (1976).




total contributions in that calendar year exceed $200, any contri-
bution within any reporting period in that calendar year, regard-
less of value, must be reported. s All contributions from the same
person during the calendar year must be under the same name,
and a contribution which represents contributions by more than
one person must be reported with an accompanying writing signed
by all the contributors, indicating the amount to be attributed to
each contributor.9 4 These requirements are designed to make pub-
lic the names of those who are financially supporting each candi-
date in order to avoid subterfuge and disguised or misleading sup-
port and to ferret out contributions which are actually in-kind,
difficult to value or in the nature of personal favors or services.
3. Independent Expenditures
The regulations established in August 1976 to enforce the Act
and spell out the procedural requirements of the FEC set forth
clear guidelines on independent expenditures. Since independent
expenditure limits were nullified by the Buckley decision, both
Congress in the 1976 amendments and the FEC in the 1976 estab-
lishment-of-chapter regulations attempted to close loopholes and
prevent abuse that could easily occur without strict guidelines. Al-
though the question was one of expenditure limitations, it is
closely akin to contribution questions, since an independent expen-
diture, if found not to be entirely "independent," automatically be-
comes a contribution. The candidate or his/her committee may not
have had the opportunity to actually spend the money, but it is a
contribution nonetheless.
9 5
The 1976 law requires that independent spenders state under
"penalty of perjury" whether there was any cooperation with any
93. 11 C.F.R. § 104.3(b)(3) (1980).
94. 11 C.F.R. § 104.8 (1981).
95. Note that there is a limit on contributions to a committee or individual that is
making independent expenditures, or to an "unauthorized committee." In Advisory Opinion
Ruling 1976-20, the Federal Elections Commission stated that the Buckley decision did not
remove the restriction on contributions up to $1,000 from individuals to an unauthorized
committee. The "right to vigorous advocacy" by an individual, the Commission stated, does
not extend to donations or contributions to another person or organization to communicate
for the original speaker. Therefore, even though it is permissible for an individual or organi-
zation to make unlimited independent expenditures for the nomination or election of a can-
didate, if an individual or organization makes a contribution to other individuals or organi-
zations making independent expenditures, the limits apply. See CALIFORNIA CONTINUING
EDUCATION OF THE BAR, THE LAW OF POLITICS, § 165, at 32 (P. Madden, I. Rosenblatt, C.
Sproul. ed. Supp. June 1980).
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candidate; the law also institutes the same filing requirements for
independent spenders as for contributors of more than $100, a
more stringent reporting requirement than in the 1971/74 law."
An expenditure is considered to be made in cooperation with a
candidate, and therefore not independent if it is:
(A) Based on information about the candidate's plans,
projects, or needs, provided to the expending person by the candi-
date, or by the candidate's agents, with a view toward having an
expenditure made;
(B) Made by or through any person who is, or has been, au-
thorized to raise or expend funds, who is, or has been, an officer
of an authorized committee, or who is, or has been, receiving any
form of compensation or reimbursement from the candidate, the
candidate's committee or agent . . .7
The regulations define "agent" as "any person who has actual oral
or written authority, either express or implied, to make or to au-
thorize the making of expenditures on behalf of a candidate
... ,"9' An expenditure which fails to qualify as independent
under the regulations is treated as a contribution in-kind to the
candidate and as an expenditure by the candidate.9
The law and regulations as currently fashioned have a chilling
effect on the making of independent expenditures. People who
make large independent expenditures are likely to have at least a
minimal connection with the political world associated with the
candidate. If, on a complaint being investigated by the FEC, an
independent spender is burdened with producing voluminous doc-
umentation of not ever associating with the candidate, the chilling
effect increases. The reporting requirements and disclosure, likely
to result in press coverage when the expenditure is significant, cre-
ate additional burdens on the freedom of political expression.
H. Use of Private Wealth
The remaining contribution question plaguing constitutional
96. The 1971/74 FECA laws did not require that reports cover contributions which were
amassing cumulatively.
97. 11 C.F.R. § 109.1(b)-(c) (1981).
98. Id.
99. Id. An expenditure made in "callusion," or involving any cooperation, consultation
or in concert with the candidate or the candidate's authorized agent, automatically loses the
"independent" label, becomes a contribution and is then subject to the limitations imposed
by the act on contributions.
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scholars and political scientists is that of the use of private wealth
by a candidate. With the Buckley decision freeing candidates from
any ceilings on the use of personal funds,100 there is an obvious
advantage given to the wealthy candidate who is able to spend mil-
lions of dollars for him or herself, unless that candidate is ac-
cepting the public financing. 10
Much like the independent expenditure, however, there is a
strong flavor of a contribution in an expenditure of one's own
funds. One makes a contribution to one's own campaign, to be ex-
pended as the campaign sees fit. Since there are limitations on con-
tributions, should not personal donations or loans, those paid back
or those to be forgiven, be subject to the same kind of controls?
In Buckley the Court justified limitations on contributions, ex-
plaining how their "symbolic" nature afforded them less protection
of the first amendment than expenditures. Clearly, there is no need
for any symbolic gesture of support from a candidate to him-or
herself. A gift to oneself in the personal expenditure case presents
a fuzzy line as to what is an expenditure and what is a
contribution.
Professor Alexander again illustrates the effect of the Buckley
decision in his introduction to Campaign Money: Reform and Re-
ality in the States, stating that the "[c]ourt has created an anom-
aly that Congress and the state legislatures will have to resolve
S. .. [T]his puts at a considerable disadvantage the opponents of
wealthy candidates, who must depend on contributions from indi-
viduals or groups which are limited in the amount they may give to
any candidate.' 0 2 Alexander offers two alternatives: contribution
limits could be raised or repealed. Either would open up the ability
of challengers to become more effective. However, raising the lim-
its would not solve the personal wealth problem, and repealing
opens up "big money" problems on the contribution side, including
actual or apparent corruption or undue influence.
A third alternative would be to retain the current contribution
limits, rely on the current law and regulations to make indepen-
100. 424 U.S. at 52. See text accompanying note 63, supra.
101. Under the limitations of 2 U.S.C. § 441a, presidential candidates accepting public
funds under § 9003 and § 9033 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 are limited to expendi-
tures of $10 million in a primary election and $20 million in a general election. See also note
44, supra.
102. Alexander, Introduction: Rethinking Reform, CAMPAIGN MONEY: REFORM AND RE-
ALITY IN THE STATES 6 (H.E. Alexander ed. 1976). See also Justice Marshall's dissent in
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 289.
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dent expenditures difficult,10 3 and enact guidelines on the type and
use of personal funds in a campaign. If such guidelines can differ
in quality from directly imposed limitations on the use of personal
wealth, perhaps such wealth can be controlled and still be within
the constitutional bounds articulated in Buckley. Even if chal-
lenged and examined in the Supreme Court, the very enactment of
such provisions would demonstrate additional congressional con-
cern for what Justice White calls "salutary purposes related to the
integrity of federal campaigns.'
'10 4
Public financing may also involve the question of candidate
opportunity, providing a "floor" which can help challengers who
have limited funds or fundraising ability. The rationale is that if
financing is adequate, the public will have the opportunity to hear
the message of the candidate and make a good decision. The ques-
tion of what is adequate in the day and age of Madison Avenue
media and electronic technology services becomes more difficult,
raising questions as to the effect of television advertising as op-
posed to that of the print media, the vulnerability of the public to
slick, sophisticated, and possibly deceptive advertising, and a host
of other concerns. Yet, the. Supreme Court has let stand expendi-
ture limitations when a candidate has accepted public financing."'
This may serve to equalize opportunity. If the plan is voluntary,
however, candidates may elect to waive public funds and spend an
unlimited amount from their own personal fortune.
I. Summary
Recent political finance studies indicate that individual contri-
bution limits are too low. According to a 1979 report prepared by
the Campaign Finance Study Group of the Institute of Politics at
Harvard University,'0 6 most campaigns have too little money. The
Study Group concluded that "[w]hile campaign finance laws must
certainly guard against the undue influence of wealthy interests of
103. Independent expenditures against candidates are even easier to present as "inde-
pendent," in that the independent opposition rarely acts in "collusion" with, or in "concert"
with the candidate. See generally, Perry, Liberal Incumbents Are Main Targets of TV Ads
as Political-Action Groups Exploit Court Ruling, Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1980, at 36, col. 1.
104. Buckley v. Valeo, 434 U.S. at 1 266.
105. See note 44, supra.
106. The Campaign Finance Study Group, The Institute of Politics, Harvard Univer-
sity, An Analysis of the Impact of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 1972-1978, May 1979




individuals in the political process, they should at the same time
be designed to enhance rather than hinder the raising and spend-
ing of campaign funds deemed appropriate.
10 7
Although the low limits force candidates to build the cam-
paign treasury from a broad, grass-roots foundation ("small chunks
from many sources"),108 many candidates simply turn to political
action committees (PACs) for a more accelerated build-up of the
treasury. According to the Study Group, congressional candidates
have increased their reliance on PACs from at most 14% in 1972 to
25% in 1978.109 As this occurs, there is less reliance on financial
help from a broad base of contributors and political parties, with a
consequent lower participation level of citizens and political
parties.
The Study Group recommends an increase to $3,000 per indi-
vidual to alleviate some of the adverse effects mentioned and to
ease the burden of the candidate who must start from an empty
treasury. The Study Group points out that the most ominous effect
of the limitations is the growth of the PACs. As PACs become in-
creasingly the "key" source, candidates rely more heavily on them.
Since PACs are frequently organized to promote issues, or, as is
frequently heard, an issue, candidates are increasingly responsive
to the issues or issue. The Study Group notes: "If one of the origi-
nal intentions of campaign finance reforms was to limit the appear-
ance of influence of special interests in the political process, the
law has, in practice, had the opposite effect."110 Although this Note
is not a study of the effect of the FECA in general, the contribu-
tion controls in the FECA do play a role in the political finance
arena, and the development of PAC-power and the decline of polit-
ical parties in campaign finance illustrate some of that impact.
In order to curb the influence of PACs, the Study Group ana-
lyzed the probable effects of legislatively reducing the amount of
money which PACs could contribute. The Group concludes and
recommends:
That change will merely divert, but not stem, the flow of money.
Proliferation of political action committees, perfectly legal coop-
eration among PAC's, and a rapid expansion in independent ex-
penditures by PAC's are the clearly predictable consequences.
107. Id. at 1-2 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 1-3.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1-8.
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Considering the combined reasoning which governed the Buckley
and Belotti decisions, there does not appear to be a legislative
remedy for this development that will pass constitutional muster.
Consequently, the Study Group urges the Congress to move
in the direction of making candidates less dependent upon money
channeled through political action committees by raising the indi-
vidual contribution limit."'
The Study Group further recommends that disclosure amounts be
raised to $500 to ease the reporting burden on the candidate, stat-
ing: "journalists concentrate on large contributions in any case.
These will still be available to them, and they will appear in a
more accessible form."
112
The disclosure requirement recommendations made by this
group appear to be a call for fine-tuning the Act. In a message to
Congress on March 22, 1977, President Carter forwarded a number
of recommendations for the strengthening of the Federal Election
Campaign Act. In addition to urging Congress to extend public
financing to House and Senate elections, the President expressed
hope that Congress will "address" the problem of the candidate
accepting public funds being at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the candi-
date who refuses public funds and spends freely from his or her
own personal wealth, but offered no recommendations as to the
methods Congress could employ or enact to solve the disparity." 3
III. WEST GERMAN POLITICAL FINANCE
REGULATION
Since the Federal Republic of Germany does not have an ex-
tensive body of campaign finance regulation, it need not concern
itself with fine-tuning legislation such as the Federal Election
Campaign Act, pursuing loopholes, or measuring the effects of
amendments and court decisions for their equalizing impact, or
lack thereof, in the political arena.
As a parliamentary system of government, the political parties
are the repositories of campaign finances. It is the political party
which nominates candidates, gathers and spends funds, creates
governments, and establishes the party program which will become
the policy of the government or the platform of the opposition in
111. Id. at 1-9.
112. Id. at 1-27.
113. Election Reform Message to the Congress, 1977 PuB. PAPERS 482, 483 (1978).
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the Bundestag.114 Yet, despite the lack of political finance regula-
tion, West German parties are the only parties in a Western demo-
cratic state whose organization and internal procedures are partic-
ularly regulated by law. This law, entitled the Political Parties Act
(Parteiengesetz), was enacted in 1967 and sets out those proce-
dures the parties must follow in internal elections, arbitration
within the party, and in adopting a platform. 115
A. The German Electoral Process
The German political campaign mechanism bears some exami-
nation as a background to discussion of the contribution controls
of the Political Parties Act. Because there is no system of primary
elections to select party candidates, it is the party which retains
significant control in the recruitment of candidates, and not the
candidates themselves. Party organizations in 248 single-member
constituencies nominate their party candidate for a seat in the
Bundestag.16 However, only half of the 496 seats in the Bundestag
are filled by single-member selections by the voters; the other half
are drawn from party lists in each of the ten Lidnder (states).
These lists are selected by party conventions in each Land, thereby
providing another local control of the nomination process.
1. Voting Procedures
Voters cast two votes in the election of members to the
Bundestag. The first vote, the Erststimme, is for a specific candi-
date for the single-member electoral district, designated as a sin-
gle-member district candidate with his or her party affiliation. Two
hundred forty-eight seats are filled in this manner. The second
vote, the Zweitstimme, is cast for the party list the voter prefers.I' 8
The Erststimme and Zweitstimme need not reflect the same party
choice: a single-member electoral district candidate of one party
may be selected on the ballot, and a party list of another party
selected in the Zweitstimme. The remaining 248 seats are distrib-
uted among the party lists giving each party a total number of
114. The Bundestag is the lower house of the German Parliament.
115. Parteiengesetz, supra note 1, as amended by Law of June 25, 1969 [1969] BGB1 I
S.645, art. 15, Law of July 22, 1969 [1969] BGB1 I S.925, and Law of July 24, 1974 [1974]
BGB1 I S.1537.
116. G. LOEWENBERG, PARLIAMENT IN THE GERMAN POLITICAL SYsTEM 63-65 (1967).
117. Id. A Land is somewhat equivalent to a state in the United States.
118. E. PLISCHKE, CONTEMPORARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY 162 (1961).
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seats in the entire Bundestag corresponding to a proportion of the
national vote the party received in the various Zweitstimmen."9 In
order to maintain the proper proportion, a party which wins a
large number of constituency (Erststimme) seats will receive corre-
spondingly fewer seats based on the party list (Zweitstimme) vote.
Elmer Plischke analyzes the arguments in favor of propor-
tional representation,12 0 noting that it reflects more accurately the
"main streams of political opinion," and that a single-member con-
stituency candidate selection in a multi-party system can result in
a candidate being elected by a plurality, and thus,.by a minority of
voters in the constituency."1" The opposing point of view, however,
considers that the single-member constituency candidate selection
is more personalized; the voter selects an individual on the basis of
knowledge about the candidate. This, in turn, according to
Plischke, forces the parties to exert greater care in the nomination
of candidates. The Federal Republic uses a compromise system of
half-single-member constituency and half-proportional representa-
tion to capture the advantages of both systems and avoid the kind
of parliamentary fragmentation which plagued the Weimar
Republic.'22
2. The Role of Political Parties
The current electoral arrangement is a distinct move away
from the highly centralized list system that typified the Weimar
Republic, and which tended to isolate the elected representative
from the public. 23 The present compromise which includes direct
119. G. LOEWENBERG, supra note 116 at 64. See also id. at 65, n.39 for an excellent
discussion of the election of single-member district candidates and party lists with the dis-
tribution formula applied to give Bundestag seats to party candidates.
120. The historical evolution of the current electoral arrangement of part-single-mem-
ber selection, part-Land list selection is interesting in itself. The Christian Democratic party
opposed the system of proportional representation proposed in a draft of the Grundgesetz,
fearing proliferation of small, fragmentary parties, as seen from experience under the Wei-
mar Constitution. Social Democrats believed that proportional representation would help
the party even where other parties achieved a plurality in a particular district. A draft of the
electoral law by the Parliamentary Council was approved by the Western Military Gover-
nors in May 1949, and set forth a compromise under which 60% of the delegates were sin-
gle-member selections and 40% from party lists. This was eventually altered to the present
50-50 split. See E. PLISCHKE, supra note 118, at 157-59, 161-62. See also J. GOLAY, THE
FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 138-56 (1958).
121. E. PLISCHKE, supra note 118, at 162.
122. See id. at 162-63. The Weimar Republic was the form of government adopted by
Germany from 1919 to 1933.
123. G. LOEWENBERG, supra note 116, at 66.
[Vol. 4
Political Finance Regulation
single-member election is in part an effort to provide for more di-
rect public input, more public scrutiny of the selection of
Bundestag members, and thus, more public accountability. Yet,
according to Gerhard Loewenberg, voters tend to vote for the sin-
gle-member delegate who represents the party for which they in-
tend to vote in the Zweitstimme.124 The party label is thus all-
important to the local candidate, not only for his or her own affilia-
tion, but for the efficacy of the party list sharing the same ballot.
In this respect, the party wields exceptional influence in the electo-
ral politics of the Federal Republic.
Party membership is very small, however. The narrow base
membership, in some cases ranging from two to six percent of the
electorate, is also reflected in the financial support on which par-
ties depend.125 Parties collect only a small percentage of financial
support from membership dues. A larger portion is collected from
business or trade associations and from public financing.1 26 Busi-
ness associations and labor organizations have the ability to mobil-
ize political support on a wider scale than the parties themselves,
so a relationship of mutual benefit has developed between the par-
ties and interest groups. The power and resources of the interest
groups compensate for the narrow membership base in the parties
and the financial base from membership dues.
3. Nomination Process
The nomination of candidates is under the control of the par-
ties. The Political Parties Act does impose, however, the require-
ment that parties employ certain democratic, parliamentary rules
of procedure. 127 Members of a party in a constituency are entitled
to vote by secret ballot for their choice of the party nominee. Such
a vote may be done through delegates at a party meeting.
Members of a party at the constituency level, and particularly
the leaders of such party organizations, typically attempt to pre-
vent interference from the Land party organization in the nomina-
tion of candidates for the constituency. Frequently, however, there
is a bargaining process in which a local candidate favored at the
Land party level may be given preferential placement on the Land
124. Id. at 67.
125. Id.
126. Id. See W. STAHL, THE POLITICS OF PosTwAR GERMANY 23 (1963).
127. Parteiengesetz, supra note 1, §§ 6-16. See also G. LOEWENBERG, supra note 116, at
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party list of candidates for the seats which are distributed to
achieve proportionality in the Bundestag. Since the law permits a
constituency candidate to appear on the ballot on the Land party
list as well, and the historical pattern reflects a high success rate of
those local candidates whose names also appear on the Land list,
the constituency party organization will be sensitive to the selec-
tion of a candidate that the Land party organization may favor in •
the Land list.12 Of course, if the seat is safe for the party in con-
stituency, there is less of a tendency to bargain with the Land
party.129 In the case of Land party lists, members of the party
throughout the Land nominate, either directly or indirectly
through delegates, by secret ballot, the party's list of names to be
presented on the ballot in the general election.
Although an incumbent constituency representative may occa-
sionally face a challenge at the party nominating level, the incum-
bent clearly works from a position of strength. Members of the
Bundestag who are elected from party lists frequently work as
"step-members" for the constituency in which they live, or in
which they ran as a constituency member but lost, or for a neigh-
boring constituency, in order to present themselves as "heir-ap-
parents" for the constituency seat in the future.130
When there is an open seat, a number of considerations play a
role in the selection of a nominee: residence, party activity, local
renown, occupation, and religious affiliation. In rural areas, for ex-
ample, landowners and leaders of the agricultural associations are
prime candidates. The social, religious and economic interests
within the CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union and its Bava-
rian branch, Christian Social Union) make it highly likely that
nominees will be active in church or Catholic trade organizations.
In the SPD (Social Democratic Party), trade union employees,
teachers, and party organizers fare best in the nominating process.
The FDP (Free Democratic Party) has a narrow base of member-
ship in the first place, yet because it has appeal principally to busi-
ness and professional classes, lawyers and industrialists generally
gain the favored spot on the party ballot. The FDP attempted in
1957 to broaden its appeal to the rural segment by nominating
some farm leaders, but the effort failed due to the small impact
128. G. LOEWENBERG, supra note 116, at 69-70.
129. E.g., the CSU, which is strong in Bavaria, or the SPD in Hansestadt Hamburg.
130. G. LOEWENBERG, supra note 116, at 75.
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which individual candidates have on the voters.3 1 Instead, it is the
party label, and the success of the campaign for the party, which
carries particularly heavy weight.
Prominent political personalities create an exception to the
general rule. Those people who are reported widely in the press
and on television will be known to the voters of a constituency, and
may cause "split-voting." For example, a CDU voter in Hamburg
may vote in the constituency in which Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
is on the ballot. The voter may vote for Schmidt, an SPD candi-
date, in the Erststimme, then vote the CDU ticket of party list
candidates in the Zweitstimme.
The corresponding value of a strong candidate to the party
will inevitably weigh heavily in the nominating process. The SPD
in Chancellor Schmidt's constituency is not likely to nominate a
different candidate, and in fact, hopes that the Chancellor may
bring other independent voters to the SPD party list through the
strength of the Chancellor's image. Parliamentary performance is
not always controlling, however. According to Professor Loewen-
berg, the voters' judgment of candidates is "only a remote influ-
ence on the nominating agencies.1 32 Instead, the nomination of
candidates is driven by factors including the narrow membership
base of the parties, the role of interest groups at the constituency
and Land levels and the activism of party members at those levels.
Financial support of the parties is directed toward the even-
tual election of candidates already nominated by the party. Contri-
butions to parties by individuals and corporations, beyond mem-
bership dues, are therefore given with the success of the party, and
not the individual candidates, in mind. In light of the foregoing
analysis of the electoral system, financial support by contributors
will play a small role in the nominating process of individual can-
didates, unless the contributor is seeking to be nominated him or
herself, or the contribution to the party is given by someone who
makes clear to senior party leaders his or her preference of
candidates.
131. Id. at 77. Professor Loewenberg provides tables that indicate nomination patterns
of members on or off Land lists (at 72), the proportion of mandates won by parties in single-
member constituences (at 21), re-election rates (at 74), and occupational background of
elected members (at 124). See also W. STAHL, supra note 126, at 20-21 (1963) for an expla-
nation of interests and adherents of the parties. This book was published before the adop-
tion of the Political Parties Act, however, and does not reflect current law on party finance
disclosure regulation.
132. G. LOEWENBERG, supra note 116, at 83.
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B. Contribution Controls
The major contribution control is a disclosure limit estab-
lished in section 25 of the Political Parties Act. That section re-
quires the disclosure of any gifts to a political party greater than
DM 20,000 in one calendar year, including the name and address
of the donor, and the amount contributed.3 3 An audited statement
of income must be published annually in the Federal Gazette
(Bundesanzeiger). However, accounting reports need not be deliv-
ered to the President of the Bundestag for publication until Sep-
tember 30th of the year following the report's calendar year end.'-"
The foundation for the Political Parties Act is found in the
Grundgesetz, the Basic Law of 1949, which serves as the constitu-
tion of West Germany."3 5 Article 21 of the Grundgesetz, entitled
"Political Parties," provides that:
The political parties participate in the forming of the political
will of the people. They may be freely established. Their internal
organization must conform to democratic principles. They must
publicly account for the sources of their funds. 3'
This constitutional principle was approved in 1949, yet no legisla-
tion to enact any public accounting was produced until the Politi-
cal Parties Act in 1967.3
The history of German political finance reveals the reluctance
with which the public disclosure requirement came into being. The
last decade of the 19th century saw the rise of numerous groups
which served to gather funds on behalf of general political inter-
ests, paralleling the political parties. In the socialist working-class
subculture in the industrial cities, and in rival labor organizations,
the Social Democratic Party (SPD) had started to flourish. The
SPD used the same organizational abilities that the trade unions
were applying in increasing their membership and funds.38
133. Parteiengesetz, supra note 1, § 25.
134. Id. § 23.
135. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] (W. Ger.) The GG will not serve as a full constitution until
reunification of all occupied sectors occurs.
136. Id. art. 21(1).
137. See Casper, Williams v. Rhodes and Public Financing of Political Parties Under
the American and German Constitutions, 302 Sup. CT. REv. 271, 286-87 (1969).




In response to the rapid growth of trade unionism and the un-
derground socialist organizations, business entrepreneurs became
increasingly concerned and developed "conveyor groups," business
organizations which could channel political funds. The entrepre-
neurs thereby attempted to achieve greater political influence,
"preferably at the expense of the industrial workers."'1 9 Professor
Arnold Heidenheimer notes that these interest associations and
conveyor groups had "increased and politically mobilized their fol-
lowing to an unprecedented degree. This led to increases in voting
11140participation....
The conveyor system provided more flexibility to pick and
choose among parties and exert influence where needed. Yet when
the 1918 single-district electoral system was replaced by a propor-
tional representation system based on regional lists, conveyors lost
some of that flexibility and could only distribute funds in a hap-
hazard fashion among pro-industry candidates' parties. Other sup-
port organizations and sponsors channelled money to parties, but
only after receiving it from the industrial establishment. In some
cases, however, the heavy industrialists demanded quid pro quos
which were severe and reached far into the internal affairs of the
parties.
41
In the 1950's, the conveyor groups of industrialists and entre-
preneurs found themselves in an excellent position to "exert covert
political decision-making powers."'1 42 They reasoned that industry's
bargaining position vis-a-vis the parties "would be strengthened if
funds from individual firms were channelled as completely as pos-
sible through their associational conveyors, cumulated at the Land
and national level, and then redistributed from the top down.'
143
The increased centralization protected individual businessmen
from snooping and questions from the party finance committees
and provided a comfortable anonymity. Industrial trade unions
had a more difficult time, especially when rival and decentralized
union activity conflicted with the goal of a centralized political ef-
fort. Even though an income tax deduction was available in the
139. Id. at 23.
140. Id. at 24.
141. Id. at 41.
142. Id. at 48.
143. Id. at 50.
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1950's to firms making direct donations to parties, the business
firms felt bound to maintain the use of the associational groups
and continued to channel money through those groups or "civic"
conveyors, who also acted as collection agencies.
14 4
The impact of those conveyors was significant. By supporting
the CDU, penetrating all levels of the CDU, and maintaining an
overview of the party financial resources, the conveyors played a
critical role in maintaining Chancellor Adenauer in office in the
1950's. However, when FDP officials subsequently disengaged from
the CDU, thus weakening the coalition, the conveyors lost some of
the power they had previously exerted.145 Concurrently, the SPD
became significantly more successful at raising large amounts of
funds from voluntary membership "dues," based on the income of
the member and collected through the purchase of stamps each
month. Conveyors started to cause more embarrassment than help
in some cases, and some party professionals began to talk of the
need for state financing of the parties.
C. Government Regulation
In trying to fashion a basic law governing parties and party
financing, different means were considered to increase the level of
donations. Both prohibitions on certain types of contributions and
disclosure requirements were considered ineffective. There was an
underlying fear that supports would be cut off or diminished by
such controls. The American experience was known in West Ger-
many, but American prohibition of corporate contributions was
discounted as unenforceable and necessitating a huge police appa-
ratus.1 46 German corporate donations were being channelled
through intermediaries in any case.
Disclosure, however, became a more partisan issue. The CDU
and other non-socialist parties argued that, despite the language of
article 21 of the Grundgesetz requiring public disclosure of party
finances, disclosure would have a serious chilling effect on contri-
butions. The CDU Treasurer in 1965 stated that no one would give
a donation to the parties if it was to be immediately reported in
the newspapers; no one would be "so crazy" as to allow publication
144. Professor Heidenheimer outlines the history of the conveyors and associated
groups in a definitive manner. Id. at 20.
145. Id. at 62-63.
146. Id. at 74-75.
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of his donation which could lead to a loss of business from clientele
of the other party.'
1. Disclosure limits
A proposed disclosure limit of DM 5,000 was rejected in 1959.
Similarly, an SPD compromise figure of DM 10,000 failed to gain
support in 1964. 14 The final amount adopted in the Political Par-
ties Act of 1967 was DM 20,000 for individuals and DM 200,000 for
corporations. However, a Federal Constitutional Court decision
overturned the larger figure for corporations, holding that the dis-
tinction between legal and natural persons was arbitrary with re-
spect to such donations.149 As a result, the Act was changed in
July, 1969 to DM 20,000 with respect to all donors.150
The feared chilling effect on contributions has been dimin-
ished by the late annual reporting of these donations and the abil-
ity to channel money through intermediaries. It is in the interests
of the political parties to encourage increased donations and broad
participation. The drive for public accountability for these monies
is not nearly as strong as it is in the United States.
2. Public Financing
More than these other factors, increased reliance-o-n public
financing may be responsible for the reluctance to enact more
stringent regulations or establish contribution prohibitions or limi-
tations. Each party which receives at least 0.5% of the votes at a
Bundestag election is subsidized at a rate of DM 3.50 per vote.
This figure was DM 2.50 in the enactment of the Political Parties
Act, and raised to DM 3.50 in 1974.151 Subsidy payments are made
after the President of the Bundestag receives the annual income
147. Id. at 76 (from Der Spiegel, Feb. 3, 1965, at 24).
148. Id. at 77.
149. Judgment of Dec. 3, 1968, BVerfGE 24,300 at 357 (W. Ger.).
150. Parteiengesetz, supra note 1, as amended by Law of July 22, 1969 [1969] BGB1 I
S.925.
151. Parteiengesetz, supra note 1, § 18. See also Schleth, Parteifinanzen: Eine Studie
iiber Kosten und Finanzierung der Parteientiitigkeit, 11 POLrITK UND WXHLER (1973). In
the period 1972-1976, the major federal parties received reimbursements totalling DM 142
million (approx. US $56 million) and when combined with figures of subsidies paid to par-
ties at the Land (state) level, the figure was almost US $200 million. Khayyam Zev Paltiel,
Public Financing Abroad: Contrasts and Effects, 9, (Sept. 1979) (paper presented to Parties,
PACs and Campaign Finance Laws Conference sponsored by American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C.).
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reports which contain the disclosure of large contributions.
These subsidies and grants from government-controlled foun-
dations to the political parties in West Germany may obviate the
need for more stringent contribution controls. The public financing
serves to establish a "floor" providing an equal opportunity for the
political parties, and encourages rather than discourages the desire
of individuals and groups to contribute to political parties.
3. Tax Deductions
In a different area of political finance, that of gift tax deduc-
tions for donors, the Federal Constitutional Court recently held
that legislators have the power to establish or maintain an annual
limit on income tax deductions for gifts made to political parties.152
The Court stated that while the legislature is not obliged to con-
cern itself with political parties' financial requirements, neither is
it prohibited from considering them.1 53 The Court held that under
the Grundgesetz, the legislature is free to establish the limits it
deems proper as a result of its political deliberation.
There are limits, within which the legislature must act to re-
main within constitutional bounds. Since the Grundgesetz requires
the legislature to bear in mind the right of citizens to equal partici-
pation in the political will-building process and the principles of
equality of political opportunity, the legislature must set limits in
tax deduction and disclosure which will not aggravate inequali-
ties.""' Even though tax deductions operate as indirect financial
grants by the government, a single standard level in tax deductions
not graded to income, will not violate the constitutional principles.
The attitude of the German courts on the question of disclo-
sure is also apparent in the same decision. The Court noted that
although gifts to political parties are not barred by the Grund-
gesetz, there is no provision which can protect parties from the
influence of wealthy individuals, businesses or unions.1 55 The
Grundgesetz addresses the danger of anonymous big spenders at-
tempting to influence parties with large financial grants only in the
fourth sentence of article 21, which requires parties to give an open
accounting of their financial sources. The Court stated that the law
152. Judgment of July 24, 1979, BVerfGE 52, 63 (W. Ger.).
153. Id. at 82.
154. Id. at 89.
155. Id. at 86.
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is aimed at revealing the process of political Willensbildung, the
building of political will, to the voters, and disclosing to them
which groups, unions, or private persons attempt to influence the
parties through gifts of money. "From this point of view, it is con-
stitutionally unobjectionable that section 25 of the Political Parties
Act prescribes only the disclosure of contributors of gifts exceeding
a value of DM 20,000 in a calendar year."15
D. Summary
As the disclosure provision is constitutionally unobjectionable,
it is probably becoming less socially objectionable. Despite the gen-
eral disdain of the businessman for any publication in newspapers
of his gift to a political party, the disclosure provision and its ratio-
nale will undoubtedly settle into German political life in such a
way that political parties, eyeing their opposition, will be just as
reluctant as the courts to challenge the provision. Much as the
"floor" established with the public financing scheme obviates the
need for strict contribution controls because it ensures the equality
of opportunity at the outset, the disclosure requirement adds a
"moral" policing which Germans may consider adequate as well.
IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Where West Germany has experienced a long historical shift
from business associations conveying funds to political parties
through conveyors to a public financing program of direct subsi-
dies, the United States has developed an extensive body of
campaign finance regulation designed to prohibit, control and dis-
close certain funds used for political purposes. Contributions in
West Germany are not directly limited or prohibited in any way,
and little protection against quid pro quo arrangements or undue
influence is built into the political law. The only public accounta-
bility demanded is the annual disclosure of donations greater than
DM 20,000. From this, it would appear that Americans have gone
to great lengths to protect themselves from themselves, while
Germans are models of integrity who need no sanctions against
what must be unthinkable.
It is more likely, however, that American political finance reg-
ulation in the area of contribution controls simply reflects different
156. Id. at 87 (author's translation).
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concerns and a different political structure. The American system
is less association-oriented and more developed around the candi-
dacy of individuals. Due to the party nominating system in the
United States, individual candidates serve to carry the banner of
the party, no matter how they try to sell themselves. By compari-
son, in Germany donations go to the party, the party selects candi-
dates and uses the money to promote all that party's candidates.
As such, the monetary donation is one step removed from the indi-
vidual candidate who may serve in the Bundestag. As a result, con-
cern for the influence of prominent donors, large corporations or
elites on the performance of legislators is less acute.
The American prohibition of corporate donations reflects the
suspicion Americans have generally held toward large corporations.
Historically, the backbone of the American nation is the small bus-
inessman. A nation that values individualism and populist egalitar-
ianism will naturally attempt to protect itself from the domineer-
ing influence that huge organizations and political elites have on
the judgment of elected legislators. American campaign regulations
seem to reflect those values in its prohibitions, controls and de-
mands for public accountability. In the light of Watergate, political
finance controls are as natural as antitrust laws.
American political contribution controls have withstood con-
stitutional challenges, but several disturbing anomalies remain on
the landscape, By overturning the limitations imposed on expendi-
tures, the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo put a premium on
the personal wealth of candidates. Candidates lacking tremendous
personal fortunes must bring in small donations from many
sources and compete with candidates who may never need to worry
about such fundraising. The low dollar limit on contributions may
encourage increased reliance by candidates on special-interest
groups and political action committees. The solutions to these
problems may be found in one or a combination of several alterna-
tives: remove the contribution limits; increase the dollar amount of
the contribution limits, for example from $1,000 to $3,000; extend
public financing to House and Senate races; employ public financ-
ing and lift or remove the limits; or impose restrictions on the use
of family or personal wealth.
Any reform made to the body of regulation must be seen in
the context of the entire political finance scheme. As with fine-tun-
ing any program, impact must be predicted and gauged. It must
also undergo constitutional scrutiny. However, as Professor Alex-
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ander notes, "Politics can be improved but it probably cannot be
sterilized and purified to a degree that reformers seek.
157
Professor Alexander and J. Paul Molloy have offered a model
statute which sets no limit on contributions, but discourages large
contributions by placing a progressive tax on such donations.158
Reforms are inherently valuable if for uniformity alone, but they
must be tempered with a touch of reality.
The West German experience shows a different approach to
political finance regulation that bears comparative analysis with
the United States approach. The West German political party
nominating process takes the individual candidate out of the battle
of primary elections, where candidates compete with members of
their own party. Monetary contributions to the American candi-
dates, beginning with the nomination process, are direct and have
the possibility of directly influencing that candidate should the
candidate be elected.
The German monetary contribution is to the political party,
and is therefore more indirect in terms of the influence of the do-
nor on the candidate elected to the Bundestag. Clearly the candi-
date may know of the donor and in fact, may be closely associated
with the donor. However, the giving or withholding of a donation is
not as likely to pressure the candidate to comply with a point of
view or participate in a legislative action favorable to the donor, as
is common under the direct donation method in the American sys-
tem. The political party will provide the funds to reimburse the
Bundestag candidate's election, and such funds are from a non-
specific, general treasury. Donations are not earmarked for particu-
lar candidates.
In a 1979 decision, the German Federal Constitutional Court
addressed the kind of influence the German political system at-
tempts to deal with in the area of contributions to the political
parties:
The Grundgesetz does not fundamentally bar gifts to political
parties. Article 21 guarantees the parties freedom from the state;
not, however, absolute protection from the influence of wealthy
individuals, businesses or unions. The command of the Grund-
gesetz in article 21 requiring the political parties to give a public
accounting of their financial sources obviates the danger that
157. H. Alexander, supra note 5, at 26.
158. CAMPAIGN MONEY: REFORM AND REALITY IN THE STATES, supra note 102, at 322-27.
No. 3]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
anonymous donors, through large financial gifts, will attempt to
affect the long-term goals of their favorite parties or decisions
within the party affecting them, in order to indirectly obtain more
or less influence on the political Willensbildung. This constitu-
tional command is of prime significance. It is aimed at making
visible the process of political Willensbildung for voters and to
disclose which groups, unions or private persons attempt to politi-
cally influence the parties through gifts of money.159
In the German electoral system, it has been noted that voters
will be responsive to the party label and frequently ignore the
character or features of the individual candidate. In light of such a
system, it seems appropriate to the German system that donations
to the party are being disclosed, so that the voter, according to the
Court, will be able to judge the party on the basis of its donors.
Such a disclosure provision serves to define the public image
of the party and tip off the public as to which party may be be-
holden to a wealthy individual or business. The "influence" here is
even more remote in that the individual member, once elected,
may not feel particularly beholden to the party with which he or
she is associated. Thus, the donor's influence must be channelled
through the party organization to the Bundestag member dealing
with the issues or goals of the donor. The command of the Grund-
gesetz and the Political Parties Act, however, is only aimed at pro-
viding the voters with information from which they may judge the
political parties.
In the Buckley decision, the United States Supreme Court re-
viewed the major interests in applying contribution limits, many of
which echo the concerns of the German Constitutional Court. The
Court, referencing arguments by the appellees, noted that limits
served to (1) prevent "corruption spawned by the real or imagined
coercive influence of large financial contributions on candidates'
positions and on their actions if elected to office. . . . (2) to equal-
ize the relative ability of all citizens to affect the outcome of elec-
tions" and (3) aid in general cost-containment. 160
The German Court did not address the last two concerns. The
question of the equalization of the effect on elections has been ad-
dressed through the public financing system, where a "floor" pro-
vides a higher balance of equal opportunity for parties and candi-
dates. The first concern, that of the undue influence of the
159. Judgment of July 24, 1979, BVerfGE 52, 64 at 86 (W. Ger.) (author's trans.).
160. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1975).
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contributors, is the basis of almost all of the American system of
contribution controls, including the FECA of 1971.101 It parallels
the concern of the Grundgesetz, the Political Parties Act, and the
judgments of the Federal Constitutional Court in upholding the
contribution disclosure requirement of the Political Parties Act.
162
While the concern for undue influence is paramount in both
cases, the nature of the influence is clearly different: American
contributors have the potential for direct, immediate influence on
an elected official or candidate; German contributors may influence
instead the goals, structure, and directions of a political party
which nominates and promotes the election of members for the
Bundestag. Perhaps one of the strengths of the German parlia-
mentary system is that elected members nominated by their par-
ties are more remote from the influence of big contributors. The
Bundestag member is several steps removed from donors who
favor his or her party and his or her election.
Yet, as noted above, political party membership in Germany is
small and narrowly based. The parties must deal with special in-
terest groups in order to become politically efficacious. Parties are
thus subject to the same pressures that American candidates are,
and may exert that pressure on the elected members of their party.
Incumbents hold strength in Germany, though, and it is not likely
that the party will replace the incumbent. The incumbent may, in
some cases, serve to strengthen the party, particularly if he or she
is an able spokesperson for the party. In such a case, the party may
be "captive" to the Bundestag member and candidate.
In contrast to the American system, then, the German concern
for undue influence of wealthy donors may be adequately served
merely by the disclosure requirement. There may be adequate
"buffers" between the member of the Bundestag and the donor.
The interest of the Federal Constitutional Court is that the voter
be given the opportunity to know how the parties are being
supported.
A limit on contributions, justified in Buckley, does not fit well
within the German system, where party finances are handled out
of a general party treasury which is not organized to provide
earmarked contributions from a particular donor to a particular
candidate. However, earmarking can occur, de facto, through large
161. FECA, supra note 2.
162. See Judgment of Dec. 3, 1968, BVerfGE 24, 300 (W. Ger.); Judgment of July 24,
1979, BVerfGE 52, 64 (W. Ger.).
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contributions to a constituency level party organization, which will
use finances to elect a constituency member.
Additionally, because of the narrow and limited membership
of parties in Germany, a limit on contributions would serve to
force parties to rely more on public financing, perhaps increase
their membership base, and thereby become less dependent upon
special interest groups. None of those goals are described in the
Grundgesetz or the Political Parties Act. Open accounting is the
principal constitutional mandate, not the chilling of free political
speech made through contribitions.
Both the German and American political systems are regu-
lated with protections established for the public. Only the Ameri-
can system, however, places direct limitations on the amount of
money that can be donated to a political campaign. The American
regulation serves to both limit donations and disclose them,
whereas the German law requires only disclosure of the contribu-
tions in excess of a set amount. In balancing the considerations of
political free speech and the need to curb undue influence on
elected legislators, the two countries parallel each other. Both
countries note that regulation serves to impede free expression
only insofar as to allow other constitutionally mandated goals: the
open accounting of political gifts and the containment of influence
of wealthy individuals, businesses or unions.
The structural differences in these regulatory schemes reflect
the difference between the German parliamentary electoral system
and the American direct election of representatives to Congress.
The more complex American scheme is designed to protect the
public from a more direct, immediate possibility of undue influ-
ence. The Federal Republic has enacted a scheme which serves its
desire for the public accounting of large contributions to political
parties. Additional contribution controls do not seem necessary in
the German regulatory scheme, except for minor clarifications of
contributions from family members.163
163. The regulatory scheme does not prevent a family from donating a large amount,
presumably from the head of the household, with each member providing a DM 19,999 gift.
Compare 11 C.F.R. § 110.01(i)(2) (1981) which states:
Minor children (children under 18 years of age) may contribute up to $1000 to a
candidate for an election . . . if (i) the decision to contribute is made knowingly
and voluntarily by the minor child: (ii) the funds, goods or services contributed
are owned or controlled exclusively by the minor child; and (iii) the contribution
is not made from the proceeds of a gift, the purpose of which was to provide funds
to be contributed ....
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Public financing, in any case, has obviated the need for more
extensive controls in the Federal Republic and it is unlikely that
there will be much further discussion on contribution controls
there. There may be a temptation on the part of American political
regulation analysts to prefer the simplicity of the German regula-
tory scheme, and to rely solely on certain disclosure requirements.
However, the German scheme is a response to a markedly different
electoral system and may not serve the needs expressed in Ameri-
can legislation: the protection of the public from the influence on
directly elected officials by donors of large contributions.
See also CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, FEDERAL & CALIFORNIA FAIR POLIT-
ICAL PRACTICES & ELECTION LAW §§ 1.81-.83 at 75-78 (P.B. Madden & C.C. Sproul ed. 1977).
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